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For the past four years U.S. multinational corporations have been forced to
consider a group of trade methods which fall under the rubric of "counter-
trade". Although these practices have been utilized outside the United States
for many years, many U.S. corporations find them abhorrent, and continue to
seek sales through more traditional arrangements. These U.S. corporations
believe that the relationship between buyer and seller should be symbiotic.
whereas countertrade assumes a parasitic posture in favor of the buyer.
In some instances, however, everyone pays and no one benefits. The buyer
may lose out in both the short term and long term because countertrade may
lead to increased costs for the buying nation.
Since the beginning of 1982. for instance, Indonesia has required that sellers
commit themselves to engage in 100% countertrade for sales over $800.000.
Sellers must purchase from the Indonesians products worth at least 100% of
the value of the goods sold to the Indonesians. Under the new law, sellers must
purchase specific products within a limited period of time, ship them to the
country or countries from which the goods sold emanate, insure that their
purchases increase the flow of the products to the required destinations, and
pay a penalty of 50% of any unfulfilled portions of the countertrade.
To date. the Indonesians have made only small concessions in enforcing
these requirements. For example. should the seller prove a shortage of the
Indonesian export product that he is required to sell, prove that it is of
exceptionally poor quality, or prove that it carries too high a price, the
Indonesians have agreed to review the circumstances and, perhaps. extend to
the seller more time to sell the products.
Although it is understandable that the Indonesians want to improve their
economy by increasing exports. the costs of the increase will ultimately be
passed back to them. Companies trading with the Indonesians will either have
to spend money to market the Indonesian products themselves, or pay counter-
trade commissions to third parties. These companies will not internalize such
costs, but will simply pass them on to the Indonesians by increasing the price
of their goods.
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Even if Indonesia is willing to pay this price in return for an overall increase
in its exports, there may be future complications that overshadow the ad-
vantages of its countertrade policy. Specifically, competition by neighboring
countries could lead to Indonesia's paying higher prices for imports without a
corresponding increase in its exports.
The products which are being promoted by Indonesia's countertrade re-
quirements are largely agricultural, for which there exists a limited worldwide
market. For example, the world uses just so much pepper in any one year. If
Indonesia iicreases its exports of pepper, these must be a reduction of pepper
exports from other countries. (There is, after all, no shortage of pepper: if there
were, it would not be on Indonesia's list of countertrade commodities.)
Indonesia's major competitors for market share of her countertrade commodi-
ties are, logically, her neighbors, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and
Malaysia. To save their own export markets in the face of increasing Indone-
sian exports, these countries might lower the prices on their commodities. As a
result, either fewer companies would offer to sell to Indonesia (and become
involved in countertrade obligations) or, more probably, these companies
would charge Indonesia increasingly higher prices to offset the comparatively
high price of Indonesian countertrade products.
Alternatively, Indonesia's neighbors might themselves institute countertrade
requirements, thereby pressing foreign corporations to create expanded markets
for all of their products. Given that only so much of any particular agricultural
product (e.g. pepper) will be consumed in the world, the results will be
basically stable market shares for each country, varying only slightly each year
due to purely competitive pricing. This situation therefore would be almost
identical to that existing before Indonesia introduced its countertrade legisla-
tion. There would be one major difference, however: foreign corporations
selling goods to Indonesia will have inserted themselves between producers and
traditional exporters in order to appear to be satisfying their countertrade
obligations. The corporations will pay a "commission" to the traditional
exporter, who will still ultimately purchase to resell the Indonesian products.
and will pass the cost of the commission along by raising the sales price of the
goods sold to Indonesia. The same will be true for Indonesia's neighboring
competitors.
Even when the respective governments recognize what has occurred, none
will be able to drop its countertrade regulations without losing all of its market
share to those countries retaining a countertrade policy. Only if the entire
group eliminates countertrade requirements simultaneously would a semblance
of order be reached, but not without leaving deep scars in each country's
economy.
This scenario is neither inevitable nor universal. It is simply one example of
the problems which might occur in a given situation. - It does. however.
illustrate the net economic losses that developing countries might suffer by
instituting countertrade regulations.
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